Introduction
In November 2003, Congress held hearings on allegedly abusive and/or illegal tax shelters sold by Ernst & Young, LLP (EY), KPMG, LLP (KPMG) and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The accounting profession, as well as these named firms, faced a loss of reputation from information disclosed at these hearings.
1 KPMG and EY also faced possible criminal indictments or convictions resulting from Department of Treasury and Justice Department (DOJ) investigations, which ultimately could have led to the demise of these firms.
We examine market concerns about the concentration of audit providers. Companies with global operations require an international audit firm for auditor efficiency, reputation, and industry expertise, limiting their choice of auditor. If the reputation of one of the large international audit firms is tarnished such that the firm is either unable to or precluded from providing audit services, publicly-listed global firms on both U.S. and foreign stock markets could be significantly impacted. Therefore, our research should be of interest to academics and practitioners in international jurisdictions.
We use event study methodology to examine whether the market reacted negatively to news large auditors faced criminal investigations during the public announcement of key tax shelter events from 2003 to 2005. Because these investigations could have led to the demise of another large CPA firm, we use market reactions to specific tax shelter public investigation announcements and related public disclosures to make inferences about the potential impact of concentration in the audit market. We find evidence suggesting the market was concerned with large audit firm market concentration from 2003 to 2005.
We also examine whether sale of tax shelters had a reputational spillover effect, both to the involved audit firms and to the profession as a whole. We address this question by examining cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of audit clients when information was revealed during and following congressional hearings. For audit firms marketing these tax shelters, two competing hypotheses could explain negative abnormal returns. First, the reputation of the audit firm may be impaired, reducing perceived quality of the audit (DeAngelo, 1981) . Second, to the extent firm survival was threatened, the stock market may discount client stock prices because of concerns the CPA firm will no longer be available as a form of insurance (Menon and Williams, 1994) . To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine a profession-wide spillover effect when members of the audit profession have been accused of wrongdoing.
To draw conclusions about audit competition, we measure CARs surrounding February 20, 2004, the KPMG Federal Grand Jury investigation announcement date, and May 25, 2004, the date EY announced it was the subject of a criminal inquiry. We examine six groups of audit clients: audit clients of each Big 4 firm, Midsize firms, and Small firms. Audit clients of all groups have significant negative CARs on the KPMG announcement date. We conclude that the market was concerned with potential diminishing competition among large audit providers. On the EY announcement date, CARs are significantly negative for clients of Midsize and Small firms. Audit clients of both KPMG and EY have significantly negative CARs on their respective investigation announcement dates; these negative returns may also be attributed to reputation loss and audit quality concerns.
To address reputational spillover, we examine CARs surrounding November 18, 2003, the first day of Congressional hearings. Testimony on this date includes information about tax shelters sold by EY, KPMG, and PwC. Returns for all client groups are negative and significant.
Our interpretation, in part, is that there is reputation damage to the profession as a whole because the negative market reactions are not limited to the clients of tax shelter providers singled out in the testimony. For audit clients of firms testifying at the hearings, there are other potential interpretations of the negative returns. The hearings allege compromised independence as a result of these tax shelters being sold to audit clients. To the extent the hearings were a precursor to criminal investigations, the market may have anticipated the future demise of one or more of these CPA firms.
We evaluate two other important dates, January 12, 2004 and August 29, 2005 , for the market reaction of KPMG audit clients. On January 12, 2004, the KPMG announcement of tax practice personnel changes, we observe positive CARs. This reaction is consistent with a reputation explanation, as the firm appeared to be taking steps to address problems identified in the hearings. On August 29, 2005, when KPMG admitted to criminal wrongdoing and announced a deferred settlement agreement with the DOJ, we observe negative CARs. These results are consistent with KPMG's reputation being damaged by entering into such an agreement.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the hearings and the history of tax shelters and tax shelter abuses. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops research questions and methodology. Section 4 describes the sample, descriptive statistics, and CAR estimation method. Section 5 summarizes results, Section 6 provides additional analyses, and Section 7 presents our conclusions. 6 4 The hearings underscored the extent of accounting firm involvement in marketing tax shelter products.
Background

The Congressional Hearings
Testimony and final report primarily focused on the activities of KPMG; 5 however, EY and PwC also testified at the hearings.
A history of tax shelters and tax shelter abuses
Tax shelter registration requirements under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 6111, define a "tax shelter" as any entity, plan, arrangement, or transaction, a significant purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax, which a firm offers under conditions of confidentiality, and for which tax shelter promoters may receive fees in excess of $100,000. IRC Section 6112 requires organizers and sellers of tax shelters to keep lists of investors and to make such lists available for inspection.
CPA firms began promoting tax shelters in the early 1990s, when contingent fee rules 8 In order to circumvent the "contingent fees" restriction, the fees charged by KPMG for BLIPS were called a "fixed fee", set at 7% of the generated "tax loss" clients would achieve on paper. KPMG developed "basis points" (portions of the 7% fee) which depended upon the size of the client's expected tax loss to determine their amount. The Subcommittee concluded in the case studies examined the fees charged by KPMG for their tax shelter products were clearly based upon the clients' projected tax savings (Part VI, Section B (5), page 113, paragraph 3 of the Permanent Subcommittee Report). (Anonymous, 2005a (Anonymous, , 2005b .
These editorials noted a need for more, not fewer, CPA firms and found no justice in putting the employees of KPMG out of work.
On June 13, 2005, Timothy Flynn met with DOJ officials and admitted to "selling shelters to help people avoid taxes" (Reilly, 2007) . On June 16, 2005 , KPMG issued a press release "taking full responsibility for 'unlawful conduct by former KPMG partners' in offering tax services" (KPMG LLP, 2005) . The release stated the firm had "instituted firm-wide structural, cultural, and governance reforms to ensure the highest ethical standards," including "significant change in its business practices," would "remain in discussions with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and continue to cooperate fully in its investigation," and looked "forward to a resolution that recognizes the significant reforms the firm has already made in response to this matter, while appropriately sanctioning the firm for this wrongdoing" (KPMG LLP, 2005 (Reilly, 2007) . The deferred criminal charges were ultimately dismissed because of satisfactory reforms made by the firm in its tax practice as required under the settlement agreement.
EY's involvement in tax shelters
On July 
PwC's involvement in tax shelters
On June 26, 2002, PwC announced a settlement with the DOJ and the IRS related to shelter products. 12 PwC agreed to pay a $10 million penalty, turn over a list of tax shelter clients to the IRS, and make comprehensive changes to the firm's internal quality control procedures.
PwC testified at the Congressional hearings that they had disbanded the group selling abusive shelters late in 1999 (United States Senate 2003, pp 99-100).
Other CPA firms and tax shelters
Other CPA firms were not mentioned in the Congressional hearings. However, BDO Seidman, LLP (Seidman) involvement in tax shelter-related activities was in the news during the 2002-2004 time period. Seidman is part of our Midsize firm group. The impact of Seidman's involvement in tax shelters on the Midsize group is discussed in Section 6 of this paper.
Insert Table 1 here
Literature review, research questions and research method
Literature review
Our study is based on two streams of research: auditor quality and auditors as a form of insurance. The need to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and stockholders motivates the demand for a high quality audit. DeAngelo (1981) notes it is costly and almost impossible for stockholders to observe audit quality directly; therefore, stockholders rely on audit quality surrogates. DeAngelo (1981) also asserts larger audit firms have stronger incentives
to provide high quality audits due to the amount of quasi-rents they are likely to lose if their reputation is diminished. Prior literature documents a negative impact on client firms' stock prices when auditor reputation is tarnished.
Auditor reputation is a common surrogate for audit quality in academic research (Watkins et al., 2004) . Audit quality has been examined empirically in terms of the market impact on audit clients (Baber et al., 1995; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2008; Dee et al., 2011) , as well as audit clients' stock price reaction to deterioration of their auditor's reputation (Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Hillison and Pacini, 2004; Barton, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2008) . Specifically, Chaney and Philipich (2002) find Arthur Andersen's clients experienced negative abnormal returns persisting for up to two days following the announcement of document shredding, concluding "….investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen" (Chaney and Philipich, p.1244) . Furthermore, Lennox (1999) documents a favorable stock market reaction when companies switch to a large auditor.
The insurance hypothesis is based on the premise that auditors are valued by the market both as assurance service providers and as providers of insurance to indemnify investors against losses in the event of an alleged audit failure. This hypothesis has been empirically tested using cases of audit firm bankruptcy (Menon and Williams, 1994; Baber et al., 1995) , as well as surrounding rumors of potential audit firm bankruptcy (Pacini and Hillison, 2003; Hillison and Pacini, 2004) .
Both reputation and insurance explanations can account for negative price reaction to audit clients when their auditor is perceived as providing a substandard audit (Baber et al., 1995; Hillison and Pacini, 2004; Dee et al., 2011 sanctions. This reaction is significantly more negative for financially-distressed firms. In an attempt to distinguish between the two explanations, Willenborg (1999) finds evidence suggesting the insurance-based demand for IPO audits helps explain the relationship between auditor choice and underpricing 13 . Finally, Lennox (1999) finds large audit firms do not suffer a reduction in demand for their services when facing reputation-damaging criticisms, noting the insurance hypothesis can explain the lack of evidence for reputation effects.
Negative market reaction to clients of scrutinized auditors is not limited to U.S. firms. Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) , in connection with PwC's Japanese affiliate's (ChuoAoyama) failed audit of a large Japanese cosmetics company, analyze the importance of auditors'
reputation for quality in a country where litigation does not play a critical role. They find a large number of ChuoAoyama's clients defected, consistent with the auditor reputation hypothesis.
They also find a significant negative stock price reaction on the date PwC announced they were sending auditors from the U.S. and the U.K. to address ChuoAoyama's problems. Weber et al. (2008) 17 We attempt to measure whether the magnitude of the CARs for the firms was related to shelters sold to audit clients. The GAO (2005) report indicates a number of clients purchased shelter products from their auditor, but a list of which clients did this was unavailable. We tried to obtain lists of companies and individuals who subsequently sued the CPA firms to recover losses related to the shelters but were unable to do so. named firms. Quality control or independence concerns may have damaged the firm's reputation.
In addition, any indication the firm may face criminal investigation could have implications under the insurance hypothesis.
The question of reputational spillover, especially when a CPA firm's non-audit practice potentially affects the firm's audit practice or the reputation of all CPAs, is important.
Understanding this spillover effect provides insight into firm and profession policies and practices, including disciplinary actions of professionals, inspections, and quality control issues.
If the actions of a few individuals hurt the entire profession, then more severe disciplinary actions may be needed. Further, if non-audit services damage the reputation of a firm or the profession, this may impact a firm's internal quality controls and PCAOB inspection standards.
In a study of whether the results of peer reviews signal audit quality, Casterella et al. (2009) find the factor score incorporating tax shelter activities is positive and significantly associated with the total number of weaknesses identified in auditors' self-disclosed peer-review reports, suggesting lower quality audits.
Identification of observations, descriptive statistics, and CARs estimation method
Data collection and descriptive statistics
For each event date, we obtain all auditor-client information from Audit Analytics. We eliminate firms without the necessary data on both CRSP and Compustat and those announcing an auditor switch between the effective date of the Audit Analytics information and the event date. See Insert Table 2 here
Calculation of mean cumulative abnormal returns
We obtain mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using Eventus and a window of (-1, +1) around each event date. 18 CARs are calculated using the size index, own market 19 option in Eventus, which matches each stock to a market and size decile using the CRSP reported exchange and decile number as of the event date. Non-trading dates are converted to the next trading date. The estimation period is 255 days, ending 46 days before the event date, to minimize contamination of the event window. The minimum required number of returns for the calculation of CARs is three.
Results
Audit market concentration
Results MacKinlay (1997) notes it is difficult to make generalizable conclusions when detecting a non-zero abnormal return due to adequacy concerns of the event study methodology. To address this limitation, MacKinlay (1997) suggests, among other means, shortening the event window, as we have done in our study. In addition to the (-1, +1) CAR window reported in our analyses, we also obtain CARs for alternative windows [(-2, +2) and (-3, +3)] around each event date, and do not find significant differences in the results shown in Tables 3, 4 , and 5. 19 The size index, own market option helps ensure 'abnormal' returns are based upon firms with similar characteristics while controlling simultaneously for economic effects shared by these firms. For Midsize and Small firms, we find significant negative mean CARs, -0.54% (pvalue=0.05) and -0.38% (p-value=0.05), respectively. This suggests residual concern about the continued existence of EY, as the failure of EY could cause realignments which might be most costly for the smallest audit firms. The significant mean and median tests for DT and PwC consistently suggest a positive market reaction to the stock price of these audit clients, potentially signaling the market looked favorably on the quality of the audits performed by DT and PwC on that date.
Insert Table 3 here
Reputational spillover
Our second research question examines whether the sale of shelters had a reputational spillover effect on the audit practice and caused a corresponding negative market reaction to audit clients of the named firms. We examine the mean CARs of the six groups on the first day of the Congressional hearing, November 18, 2003. Results are shown in Table 4 .
Although the hearing only included information about shelters sold by EY, KPMG, and PwC, the mean abnormal returns for all groups are negative: significant at 0.10 for clients of EY Insert Table 4 here
We evaluate additional event dates for KPMG after the hearings, the results of which are shown in Table 5 Insert Table 5 Here
Additional Analyses
Alternative event dates
We also examine CARs on May 31, 2005, the day the Supreme Court reversed the Arthur Andersen conviction. Results on this date, untabulated, are not significant.
Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression model testing for event date clustering
Given the common event-date, we also test for significance using the Schipper and Thompson (1983) regression model controls for cross-sectional dependence in residuals. Results for February 20, 2004 (Table 6 , Panel A) show our variable of interest, Event, is negative and significant for all audit groups except DT. These findings are consistent with our significant negative mean and median CARs findings in Table 3 , Panel A, and thus are robust to crosscorrelation dependence of residuals. Given that Event of DT clients is not significant, we need to be cautious in interpreting the CARs result for DT clients in Table 3 , Panel A.
For the EY criminal investigation date (Table 6 , Panel B), Event is not significant for any audit-group. The findings in Table 6 , Panel B suggest our Table 3 , Panel B findings are not robust to residual dependence. Finally, in Table 6 , Panel C, we find Event is negative and significant for both the Midsize and Small auditor-groups, consistent with Table 4 . The lack of significant results for all other audit groups suggests our prior finding in Table 4 of significant negative mean CARs for DT, EY, KPMG, and PwC are not robust to cross-correlation among residuals.
22
Insert Table 6 here 22 An alternative explanation of our Tables 3-5 findings is the potential presence of confounding events or disclosures at the Company level during our event dates, such as earnings announcements; mergers; acquisitions; stock purchases; equity issuances; and bankruptcy filings. Consistent with prior research (Thompson et al., 1987; Baber et al., 1995; Dee et al., 2011) , we repeat our analyses in Tables 3-5 , and find no evidence these potentially confounding events or disclosures influenced our mean CARs reported in any of our windows in Tables 3-5.
Multivariate analysis
To further assess negative market reaction surrounding the Congressional hearings, we conduct a multivariate analysis by regressing CARs surrounding the first day of the hearings on proxies for auditor reputation and auditor insurance value. 23 The dependent variable is the threeday CARs of Big 4 audit clients testifying during the hearings; KPMG, EY and PwC. Our model is as follows:
, where 25 CARs = the firm specific cumulative abnormal returns in a three-day event window (-1, +1), where day 0 is the first hearing date (11/18/2003); Pr_Bankrupt = the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure 26 for firm i at fiscal year-end t; LnAsset = the natural log of total assets (AT), in million dollars for firm i at fiscal year-end t; BM = the book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; Leverage = the ratio of total debt (LT) to total assets (AT) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; SaleGrowth = the growth rate in sales calculated as the change in sales (SALE) from time t-1 to time t, scaled by (SALE) t-1 of firm i at fiscal year-end t; ROA = the return on assets calculated as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by total assets (AT) for firm i at fiscal year-end t; InstHold = the percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders at the beginning of the fiscal year t; Switcher = 1 if firm i switches auditors in year t or t-1, and 0 otherwise, using (DISMISS_KEY); AASwitcher = 1 if firm i switched from Arthur Andersen in years 2000-2003, and 0 otherwise, using (DISMISS_KEY); and FeeRatio = A proxy for auditor independence. We use the fee ratio measures as the ratio of non-audit fees (NON_AUDIT_FEES) to total fees (TOTAL_FEES) for firm i at fiscal year-end t.
27
23 See Baber et al. (1995) , Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) , and Dee et al. (2011) . 24 We excluded the going concern opinion variable included in prior research because there were no firms in our sample receiving this type of audit opinion in the year prior to 2003 (2002 fiscal year) . 25 Each variable is obtained from Compustat except for bold variables (definitions), which are from Audit Analytics. 26 The Zmijewski (1984) measure (Zscore) = -4.336 -4.513*ROA + 5.679*FINL + 0.004*LIQ, where: ROA = Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), scaled by total assets (AT); FINL = Financial leverage equals total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets (AT); and LIQ = Liquidity is calculated as total current assets (ACT) divided by total current liabilities (LCT). with low book-to-market ratios and low ROAs have greater incentives to manipulate accounting performance (Baber et al., 1995; Krishnamurthy et al., 2006; Dee et al., 2011) . Our findings that EY clients with greater book-to-market ratio and greater ROA are associated with significantly higher CARs in the hearing event window support the reputation hypothesis. Alternatively, prior research finds low book-to-market firms and low ROA firms, and their auditors, are more likely to be sued (Shu 2000; Dee et al., 2011) . Under the insurance hypothesis, positive BM and ROA could indicate these firms and their auditors are less likely to be sued, resulting in significantly higher CARs. Furthermore, our combined results appear to be driven by EY audit clients.
Insert Table 7 here
We also conduct the equation (1) Table 8 . We find a significant negative association between CARs and audit client size (p-value < 0.05). This finding suggests market reaction to KPMG clients is most likely due to the insurance hypotheses, since auditor lawsuits are more likely for auditors of larger firms. Consistent with findings in Table 7 , the significant positive association between CARs and BM (p-value < 0.01) suggests the negative CARs are due to both the reputation and insurance explanations. Furthermore, we find a significant positive association between leverage and CARs (p-value < 0.05). This finding is counter to expectations. A negative coefficient on leverage is expected; therefore, the findings in Tables 7 and 8 are not conclusive for any one explanation over another.
28
Insert Table 8 here
Seidman impact on Midsize firms analyses
Given Seidman was in the public press for tax shelter activities during our analysis period, we repeat our analyses for the Midsize group (Tables 3 and 4) , excluding Seidman clients to assess reputational spillover. Our findings and conclusions (in untabulated results) are similar, providing further evidence of a reputational spillover effect.
Conclusions
This paper provides a unique summary of the U.S. tax shelter controversy, starting with
Congressional hearings in 2003 and ending with KPMG's announcement of a deferred settlement arrangement with the DOJ in 2007. Using tax shelter related events, we examine stock market concerns about auditor concentration, and effects on both the reputation of the accounting profession and the individual Big 4 CPA firms subject to investigation. We find large negative returns of audit clients of all providers when the KPMG grand jury investigation was announced.
Because the returns of all audit clients were negative, we conclude the market was concerned competition among large audit providers would be diminished, making it difficult to find independent, high quality audit and non-audit providers.
The announcement of the EY criminal inquiry indicates negative returns for clients of EY, Midsize, and Small audit providers. Negative returns for EY clients are consistent with a negative reputation effect. The negative return of Small providers is consistent with market concerns about audit concentration, since any threat to the large audit providers would potentially have the greatest impact on smaller companies.
The market reaction of all clients is negative on the first day of Congressional hearings.
Because only three Big 4 CPA firms testified, we conclude the hearings had a negative reputational impact on the entire profession, including firms not directly implicated in tax shelter activity. We test returns on two additional dates: the day KPMG announced reforms in its tax practices and the day KPMG publicly admitted criminal wrongdoing and settled with the DOJ.
Client returns on both days are negative and consistent with the reputation hypothesis.
Our findings are subject to certain limitations. There could be other important omitted variables which explain the stock price variations and their relationships to auditor reputation and the spillover effect around our event dates. Also, our study focuses on dates surrounding the Financial press reports EY, as a firm, likely will not be charged.
July 16, 2007 16, May 8, 2009 March 1, 2013
Judge dismisses charges against 13 of the 16 KPMG partners charged in the tax case.
Four EY partners found guilty by a jury in Manhattan on all counts involving the sales of fraudulent tax shelters.
EY announces settlement with the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's office, with $123 million in fines and penalties. Pos/Neg is ratio of number of positive to negative CAR for publicly listed audit clients of the respective auditor group on the date indicated. Mean CAR is mean cumulative abnormal returns using sizeindx = own market option to determine CAR, matching each stock in the sample to the market and a size decile using the CRSP reported exchange and decile number as of the event date. Eventus is used to calculate the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (t= -1 to +1) using the market model and the NYSE-only, AMEX-only, and NASDAQ-only size-decile portfolios as replacement market indices for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, respectively. Median CAR is the median cumulative abnormal returns. Mean t-test Patell Z is the standard Patell (1976) test assuming independent and identical distributions of abnormal returns. Generalized Sign test Z is the Cowan (1992) generalized sign test indicating whether the proportion of positive to negative abnormal returns around the event date is the same as in the estimation period. Schipper and Thompson (1983) Coefficients and T-statistics (in parentheses) are based on OLS. The Coefficient δ k represents the "shift in mean excess return" associated with the identified even (Schipper and Thompson 1983, p. 196) . Event equals one for the (-1, +1) window surrounding the identified date and zero otherwise. R p equals the daily return to an equally weighted portfolio of audit clients. R m equals the daily market return (using the valueweighted daily market return as a market proxy). Pr_Bankrupt is the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress measure; LnAsset is the natural log of total assets, in millions; BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; SaleGrowth is the growth rate in sales; ROA is the return on assets; InstHold is the % of shares owned by institutional shareholders; Switcher is 1 if firm i switches auditors in year t or t-1, 0 otherwise; AASwitcher is 1 if firm i switched from Arthur Andersen in years 2000-2003, and 0 otherwise; FeeRatio is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees. Note the number of observations in this Table 7 (N = 1,430) is less than the total number of observations in Tables 2 and 4 for KPMG, EY, and PwC, combined (N = 2,813) due to missing firm observations for the variables included in the Table 7 model. Note the number of observations in this Table (N = 403 ) is less than the number of observations in Table 5 (N = 807) for KPMG due to missing firm observations for the variables included in the Table 8 model.
